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The Best of Both Worlds: Maximising the 
Legitimacy of the EU’s Regulation of 
Geoengineering Research  
 
Janine Sargoni 
 
This paper suggests how the regulation of Solar Radiation Management (SRM) field 
research in Europe could be designed to maximise the possibility of securing 
legitimacy.  It argues that legitimacy is maximised when regulatory frameworks are 
legal, and also responsive, flexible, deliberative and inclusive.  By adopting an 
‘incorporated’ approach to assessing the risk of Solar Radiation Management (SRM) 
field research, the EU can import elements of ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ into its 
otherwise orthodox constitutional regulatory approach thereby maximising legitimacy.   
The argument is new in so far as it juxtaposes two conceptions of procedural legitimacy 
– one institutional and the other functional – in the context of significant scientific 
uncertainty in the technocratic regulatory paradigm of the EU.  The significance of the 
work is that it draws on these conceptions of legitimacy to advance a pragmatic model 
of institutional design which comprises procedures that maximise legitimacy with 
minimal disruption to the EU’s institutional balance of powers. 
 
I Introduction 
Back in 2009 the Royal Society’s seminal report on Geoengineering the Climate stated 
that “the greatest challenge to the successful deployment of geoengineering may be the 
social, ethical, legal and political issues associated with governance, rather than 
scientific and technical issues”.1   Neither science nor politics can be excluded and both 
need to be combined in order to provide effective, reliable and legitimate regulation of 
geoengineering risk in the European context.   Given the significant scientific 
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2 
 
uncertainty of some geoengineering activities, effectiveness and reliability may be 
more difficult to secure than legitimacy, and so, as far as regulation is concerned, the 
focus should be upon securing a legitimate process.   My paper seeks to address how 
this effective, reliable and legitimate regulation can be achieved given the prevailing 
constitutional framework of the EU.   In particular, European regulation of one type of 
geoengineering research – Solar Radiation Management (SRM) field research – could 
be designed to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy.   
 
Geoengineering has been described as “large-scale intervention in the earth’s climate 
system in order to moderate global warming”2 and can be disaggregated into at least 
two broad groups of activities:3 those that remove or reliably sequester carbon,4 known 
as Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR); and those that reflect sunlight to cool the earth,5 
known as Solar Radiation Management (SRM).   
 
As field research that takes place outdoors beyond the confines of the lab or the 
computational model, SRM presents huge regulatory challenges both technical and 
normative.  This paper considers how, principally, the latter of two areas of regulatory 
scholarship – EU regulation of risk and science, and transnational private regulation 
(TPR) – may contribute to a solution.   As “the new body of rules, practices, and 
processes, created primarily by private actors, firms, NGOs, independent experts like 
technical standard setters and epistemic communities, either exercising autonomous 
regulatory power or implementing delegated powers”,6 TPR scholarship offers some 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 There are now a range of different terms used for geoengineering and its component activities, such 
as ‘climate engineering’ in Asbjorn Aaheim et al. "The European Transdisciplinary Assessment of 
Climate Engineering (EuTRACE): Removing Greenhouse Gases from the Atmosphere and Reflecting 
Sunlight away from Earth." (2015); ‘climate intervention’ in Committee on Geoengineering Climate, 
Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth. (National Academies Press, 2015), at p. 2. The 
debate about the classification of geoengineering techniques is ongoing.  See Clare Heyward, 
"Situating and Abandoning Geoengineering: A Typology of Five Responses to Dangerous Climate 
Change." 46.01 Political Science & Politics (2013), pp. et sqq.; Olivier Boucher et al., “Rethinking 
Climate Engineering Categorization in the Context of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation”, 5 
Clim Change (2014), pp. 23 et sqq.; Duncan McLaren, “Why We Shouldn’t Be in a Hurry To Redefine 
Climate Engineering”, 15th December 2015, available on the internet at 
http://dcgeoconsortium.org/2015/12/15/why-we-shouldnt-be-in-a-hurry-to-redefine-climate-
engineering-duncan-mclaren/ (last accessed 6th January 2016). 
4 Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Climate Intervention: Carbon Dioxide Removal and Reliable 
Sequestration. (National Academies Press, 2015). 
5 Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth, supra note 3. 
6 Fabrizio Cafaggi, “New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation”, 38(1) JLS (2011), pp. 20 
et sqq.  
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potentially useful insights which may also address the reluctance of states to be 
involved.7  
 
Assessing attempts at creating legitimate regulatory frameworks this paper conceives 
of legitimacy  in terms of the ‘legality’  of ‘transnational’ regulation,  and briefly draws 
on Weber’s ‘ideal type’ of value-rational action as the basis of consent to the exercise 
of legal authority.8  However, legitimacy can also be conceived in functional and 
procedural terms as the conditions by which normative expectations can be met.9  
Considering four such conditions - responsiveness, flexibility, deliberation and 
inclusion -  this paper argues that legitimacy is maximised when regulatory frameworks 
are both legal and responsive, flexible, deliberative and inclusive. 
 
The task of demonstrating how a European regulatory framework for SRM field 
research maximises the possibility of securing legitimacy, by drawing on areas of 
transnational private regulatory scholarship and EU regulation of science and risk, is 
challenging, largely on account of the lack of empirical data.  In this paper I suggest 
that notwithstanding the germinal state of SRM field research, an embryonic regulatory 
framework is discernible which can be characterised as nascent transnational private 
regulation (nTPR) and assumes that, in the EU context, the direction of travel will be 
from nTPR to more full-blooded EU regulation. 
 
My claim is that where there is significant scientific uncertainty ‘incorporated’ risk 
assessments, as opposed to ‘isolated’ ones, should be used in the EU’s regulatory 
frameworks for SRM field research so that legitimacy can be maximised.  An 
incorporated risk assessment involves science and politics simultaneously and contrasts 
with the isolated approach – one adopted in the technocratic paradigm – which engages 
science only in the assessment of risk; politics is consigned to the management of that 
                                                 
7 Ibid, p. 23; K.W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards 
Institutions and the Shadow of the State” in W. Mattli and N. Woods (eds), The Politics of Global 
Regulation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 44 et sqq.; Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer 
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
8 Mex Weber, Economy and Society, Gunter Roth & Claus Wittich (eds) (California: University of 
California Press, 1978) 
9 Jacques Lenoble and Marc Maesschalck, “Renewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a 
Reflexive and Learning-based Approach to Governance” in Olivier De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble 
(eds), Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), pp. 3-21. 
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risk.   By adopting an incorporated approach to risk, the EU can maximise legitimacy 
in three ways: legitimacy as legality, supplementing the conditions for deliberative and 
inclusive participation in decision-making processes and by transforming a rigid 
regulatory framework into a flexible and responsive one.   This is a novel claim in that 
it advocates a regulatory mechanism – the incorporated risk assessment – which 
provides a space for inclusion and deliberation within a technocratic regulatory 
framework.10   
 
Three substantive sections of the paper set out more fully the problem posed for 
legitimacy by SRM field research, the difficulties of the EU’s orthodox response to that 
problem, and finally my alternative response based on the incorporated approach to risk 
assessment.  Section II, A Challenge for Legitimacy, defines SRM ‘laboratory’ and 
‘field’ research and goes on to suggest that there may be instances when the effects 
have significant scientific uncertainty.  Significant scientific uncertainty is defined and 
the tension between politics and science introduced.  The section suggests that the 
nascent regulation of SRM research, when viewed as transnational private regulation is 
suffering a legitimacy deficit because the regulating institutions have no formal legal 
authority to act.  Two significant issues arise: the relationship between politics and 
science in the regulating procedures and institutions, and the ability of individuals to 
participate directly or be represented in them.  
 
Section III on the EU’s response to the challenge for legitimacy argues that the EU’s 
regulation of SRM research is likely to address the challenge for legitimacy in terms of 
establishing a firm legal basis to regulate. However, the EU’s response is problematic, 
because as identified in section II above, it fixes the relationship between politics and 
science so that there is no flexibility and it makes it difficult for individuals to 
participate directly in any meaningful way in regulatory institutions.  It classifies the 
EU’s response as typically technocratic.   
                                                 
10 The technocratic/deliberative distinction of regulatory paradigms is found in other work, such as the 
Rational-Instrumental and Deliberative-Constitutive paradigms in Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation 
and Administrative Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010); Transactional and Political 
paradigms in Bronwen Morgan, “The North-South Politics of Necessity: Regulating for Basic Rights 
Between National and International Levels”, 29 J Consum Policy (2006), pp. 465 et sqq.; and ‘private 
autonomy’ and ‘collaborative enterprise’ in Tony Prosser, The Regulatory Enterprise, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010).  
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In section IV I offer an alternative response, one that maximises the possibility of 
securing legitimacy.  It seeks to make a small yet significant adjustment to legitimacy 
as conceptualised in formal legal terms by reconfiguring risk-assessments to 
incorporate elements of a more deliberative, responsive and flexible approach.  This 
mechanism is taken from a conceptualisation of legitimacy associated with directly 
deliberative polyarchy.  In this way the alternative response aims to combine the best 
of both worlds and maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy.   
 
II. A challenge for Legitimacy 
 
The effects of SRM field research can be been grouped into those that are physical – 
climatic and environmental – 11 and those that are socio-political12 or non-physical. 13  
In this paper significant scientific uncertainty relates to the physical effects of SRM 
research; which is not to say that non-physical effects are not significant or do not pose 
difficulties for legitimacy or do not have implications for SRM governance.14  I turn to 
the relationship between physical and non-physical risks in due course.   
 
1. Significant scientific uncertainty 
 
 
Uncertainty is a way of describing the limits of our understanding of a subject. It is “an 
expression of the degree to which a [subject matter]15 – such as the future state of the 
climate system – is unknown”.16  For SRM field research the subject matters are the 
                                                 
11 Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth, supra note 3, p. 47-147. 
12 Andy Parker, “Governing Solar Geoengineering Research as it Leaves the Laboratory”, Phil. Trans. 
R. Soc A (2014), 2730:20140173; Clive Hamilton. “No, We Should Not Just ‘At Least Do the 
Research’”, 496 Nature (2013), pp. 139 et sqq.  
13 Stefan Schäfer et al. "Field Tests of Solar Climate Engineering." 3.9 Nature Climate Change (2013), 
pp. 766-766. 
14 See papers 10-14 of the Theme Issue ‘Climate Engineering: Exploring Nuances and Consequences of 
Deliberately Altering the Earth’s Energy Budget’ of  Phil Trans R. Soc.A 2014: David Morrow, 
"Ethical Aspects of the Mitigation Obstruction Argument Against Climate Engineering Research." Phil 
Trans R. Soc.A  372.2031 (2014): 20140062; Adam Corner and Nick Pidgeon. "Geoengineering, 
Climate Change Scepticism and the ‘Moral Hazard’ Argument: an Experimental Study of UK Public 
Perceptions" Phil Trans R. Soc.A 372.2031 (2014): 20140063; Stefan Schäfer and Sean Low, 
"Asilomar Moments: Formative Framings in recombinant DNA and Solar Climate Engineering 
Research." Phil Trans R. Soc.A 372.2031 (2014): 20140064. 
15 I have replaced the term ‘value’ with subject matter in order to reduce its ambiguity.  In the context 
of this paper, value is associated with my definition of political activity and used contra science.   
16 “Annex II Glossary of Terms” in R.K. Pachauri and A Reisinger (eds), Climate Change 207: 
Synthesis Report – An Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Geneva, 
Switzerland: 2007), pp. 75-89. 
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physical effects of specific research projects as well as those of the broader SRM 
research endeavour.17  All else being equal, as the subject matter becomes more 
complex, the less likely we are to know this about it.  As the limits of our understanding 
increase so does uncertainty. 
 
It is for scientists to understand the limits of their understanding.  In quantifying those 
limits they make claims about scientific uncertainty.  It is scientists, then, that are best 
placed to determine whether scientific uncertainty is significant or not.18  An example 
of when uncertainty is significant is when it is unable to be quantified.     
 
Risk can be differentiated categorically from scientific uncertainty.19  Risk analysis is 
meaningful only when the level of uncertainty is low-enough to make reliable 
statements about the likelihood of events.  It is the process of risk that is important not 
the final outcome of risk.  This process is undermined if scientific uncertainty is 
significant.  My focus is on the procedure not the substantive outcome of risk analysis: 
reference to scientific uncertainty as a means of evaluating field research is not about 
the safety of those research activities,20  although clearly the certainty of knowledge 
feeds into the process of risk analysis and into determinations of safety.    
 
a. Significant scientific uncertainty in the context of specific research activities 
Owing to observations of volcanic activity, some climatic impacts of SRM are 
relatively ‘certain’.21 Some environmental effects are known also with relative certainty 
whilst the extent of the effects are less certain.22  Despite these relative certainties, the 
National Academy of Sciences concluded that “unambiguous statements about how an 
                                                 
17 Of course, this analysis of uncertainty could apply equally to non-physical effects of SRM research. 
18 I use the term ‘significant’ in its ordinary, not statistical, sense. In this paper the meaning of the word 
significant is differentiated from its use in statistics because it relates to scientific uncertainty rather 
than statistical uncertainty.  Scientific uncertainty may or may not be calculated statistically.  So, 
whilst the phrase significant scientific uncertainty could comprise statistical uncertainty, it does not 
denote it necessarily.  
19 Frank H. Knight, Uncertainty, Risk and Profit, (London: London School of Economic and Political 
Science, 1933); For conceptions of uncertainty in the IPCC see Minh Ha-Duong et al. "Uncertainty 
Management in the IPCC: Agreeing to Disagree." 17.1 Global Environmental Change (2007), pp. 8 et 
sqq.  
20 Parker, “Governing Solar Geoengineering Research”, supra note 12, pp. 3-4.   
21 Examples include: the cooling effect of stratospheric sulphate aerosols, Committee on 
Geoengineering Climate, Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth, supra note 3, pp. 69-71; the delay of ozone 
recovery, Ibid, p. 86; and changes to precipitation, Ibid., p. 75. 
22 Examples include:  the reduction of sunlight intensity, Ibid, p. 95; changes to precipitation, Ibid; and 
acidity of snow and rain, Ibid.  
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intervention by [SRM] would affect the planet are thus not possible”.23 And whilst it 
might be straightforward to characterise environmental effects such as chemistry, light 
intensity and precipitation, detecting their impacts on ecosystems could be much more 
difficult.24  Moreover, the unknown environmental impacts of SRM and its research are 
unknown: “there is also of course the possibility of environmental consequences that 
scientists have not yet identified”.25  
 
b. Significant scientific uncertainty in the context of the general SRM research 
endeavour 
The unknown unknowns of some SRM research projects raise questions about the 
broader uncertainty of the entire SRM research endeavour.  The Intergovernmental 
Panel and Climate Change IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (the AR5) of the Working 
Group I Report quantifies the uncertainty of climate change finding it extremely likely 
(95-100% probability26) that the cause of climate change is anthropogenic.  It quantifies 
uncertainty on the basis of underlying scientific understanding and degree of consensus: 
“The degree of certainty in key findings in this assessment is based on the author 
teams’ evaluations of underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a 
qualitative level of confidence (from very low to very high) and, when possible, 
probabilistically with a quantified likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely to 
virtually certain). Confidence in the validity of a finding is based on the type, 
amount, quality and consistency of evidence (e.g., data, mechanistic 
understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. 
Probabilistic estimates of quantified measures of uncertainty in a finding are 
based on statistical analysis of observations or model results, or both, and on 
expert judgment. Where appropriate, findings are also formulated as statements 
of fact without using uncertainty qualifiers”.27   
 
                                                 
23 Ibid, p. 98. 
24 Ibid, p. 95. 
25 Ibid. 
26“Summary for Policymakers” in T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. 
Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.),. Climate Change 2013: The Physical 
Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 2013), at Chapter 1, Box TS1.  
27Ibid, p. 4. 
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There is a high degree of confidence that climate change affects the uncertainty of 
environmental effects such as flooding, volcanic activity and droughts. For example, 
there is a high confidence level that the “uncertainties about future vulnerability, 
exposure and responses of interlinked human and natural systems are large”.28     Natural 
hazards exhibit both aleatory and systemic uncertainties “arising both from the inherent 
unpredictability of the hazard events themselves and from the complex way in which 
these events interact with their environment and with people”.29   Climate change 
increases the uncertainty of natural hazard frequency30 and our exposure and 
vulnerability to it,31 yet “it remains unclear whether decreasing the global mean 
temperature by SRM can reduce the number and intensity of extreme events because of 
the associated distinct regional pattern in temperature and precipitation changes”.32 
 
The AR5 is unable to quantify the uncertainty of SRM geoengineering owing to 
“limited evidence”.33 Clearly only a fraction of climate science research has been on 
SRM and some uncertainty, although not all, will be reducible through research.34  It 
does suggest that “modelling indicates that SRM methods, if realizable, have the 
potential to substantially offset a global temperature rise, but they would also modify 
the global water cycle, and would not reduce ocean acidification. …SRM methods carry 
side effects and long-term consequences on a global scale”.35   
 
                                                 
28 “Summary for policymakers” in C.B. Field, V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. 
Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. 
Levy, S. MacCracken,P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II 
to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and NewYork, NY, USA, 2014), pp. 1-32, et sqq., at p. 
11 
29 Jonathan Rougier, Steve Sparks and Lisa J. Hill, Risk and Uncertainty Assessment for Natural 
Hazards, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), at p.4. 
30 Ibid, at p. 2. 
31 Steve Jennings, “Time’s Bitter Flood: Trends in the Number of Reported Natural Disasters”, 7(1) 
Oxfam Policy and Practice: Climate Change and Resilience (2011).  
32 Jana Sillman et al., “Climate Emergencies do not Justify Engineering the Climate” 5 Nature Climate 
Change (2015) pp. 290 et sqq.;Charles L. Curry et al. "A Multimodel Examination of Climate 
Extremes in an Idealized Geoengineering Experiment." Journal of Geophysical Research: 
Atmospheres 119.7 (2014): 3900-3923. 
33 IPCC 2013, supra note 26, at p. 29. 
34 David Keith et al., "Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering: Report of a Workshop Exploring a 
Representative Research portfolio." Phil. Trans. R. Soc A:372.2031 (2014): 20140175. 
35 Ibid. 
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I am not alone in advocating the use of scientific uncertainty as a basis for making some 
governance decisions.  Among other things, it is suggested by Keith et al36 as the most 
appropriate scientific criterion to be taken into account when deciding which field 
project to pursue.   
 
c. The problem of significant scientific uncertainty for decision-making 
In its inaugural edition, the European Journal of Risk Regulation published as its 
opening article the ‘Foundations of Risk Regulation: Science, Decision-Making, Policy 
Learning and Institutional Reform’37 by Giandomenico Majone.38  In the paper Majone 
refers to ‘trans-scientific issues’ which are “questions of fact that can be stated in the 
language of science but are, in practice, unanswerable by science”.39  Frequently these 
trans-scientific issues arise in relation to the effects of technological activities.  To 
illustrate the point, Majone draws on Weinberg’s example of the certainty of 
determining the effect on health of low level radiation: “It has been calculated that, in 
order to determine by direct experimentation at the 95% confidence level whether a 
level of Z-ray radiation of 150 millirems would increase spontaneous mutation in mice 
by half of one per cent, about 8 billion mice would be required.  Time and resource 
constraints make experiments on such a scale virtually impossible”.40   
 
Trans-scientific issues raise questions about the basis on which decisions about their 
use are made and by whom.  If scientists are unable to answer questions about the 
effects of research, what is the role of the scientific assessment in the broader risk 
analysis process?  Majone asks “How does a particular institutional design affect the 
way scientific uncertainties are resolved?  What decision rules are appropriate in 
situations of high scientific uncertainty”.41  These questions and tensions will be picked 
up throughout the following sections and lie at the heart of the procedural approach 
taken in this paper.   Decisions about ‘who decides and how’ points to the question of 
legitimacy of a regulatory framework and it is to theories of regulation and legitimacy 
that I now turn.   
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 1 EJRR (2010), pp.5 et sqq. 
38 Emeritus Professor of Public Policy at the European University Institute.  
39 Majone, “Foundations of Risk Regulation”, supra note 37, pp. 5. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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2. Location of analysis of significant scientific uncertainty in the context of 
existing broad regulatory frameworks   
 
The general position regarding the regulation of environmental and climate-related 
activities tends to be determined by the existence of physical transboundary harm.  
Where the effects are contained within territorial boundaries then national authorities 
have regulatory jurisdiction.  Where the physical effects are transboundary or global 
then international legal principles or treaties tend to apply.  Table 1 sketches this general 
position in relation to types of SRM research.  It is not intended to be used as a detailed 
typography but rather a simplified depiction of the relationship between regulated 
activities and their broad regulatory frameworks42.  It will provide a reference point 
throughout the rest of the paper.  Non-physical effects of SRM research are not included 
in the transboundary/non-transboundary analysis but are for consideration and 
determination by democratic political decision-making mechanisms associated with the 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The transboundary-ness of risks may or may not align with technology development vs. process 
studies. Likewise, research vs. deployment may or may not align with EU vs. unknown regulation. 
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Broad Regulatory Frameworks by Types of SRM Research 
 
Type of 
Research 
Laboratory Field Research 
 
Deployment 
Physical 
Effect 
Non-
transboundary 
Non-
transboundary 
Transboundary Transboundary 
Examples 
of 
Research
43 
Models, 
Laboratory 
tests 
Technology 
Development 
Process 
Studies, 
Scaling Tests 
Climate 
Response 
Tests, 
Deployment 
Broad  
Regula- 
tory 
Frame-
works 
National International 
Member State                           EU 
 
European Union 
 
 Transnational  
Table 1 - Broad Regulatory Frameworks by Types of SRM Research: the group of effects and examples of field 
research is shaded pale grey; EU and transnational regulatory frameworks (engaged in this paper) are shaded 
dark grey.  
 
The upper row bounded in the heavy border sets out the three different types of SRM 
research.  Laboratory research includes computational modelling and indoor laboratory 
tests, the physical effects of which are non-transboundary44.   At the right end of the 
row is SRM research that constitutes deployment, such as climate response tests, the 
climatic effects of which are by definition transboundary.  There are likely to be 
transboundary environmental effects also.    
 
In the middle of the upper row is SRM field research.  It is a broad category of research 
that takes place outdoors or ‘beyond the laboratory’45 and which has been sharpened 
and particularised46 to include research whose objective is to test hardware,47 ‘bridge 
                                                 
43 Keith et al, "Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering”, supra note 34. 
44 These may be effects that are localised and minimal, such as increased air-moisture levels resulting 
from small-scale test of crop-leaf albedo. 
45 Parker, “Governing Solar Geoengineering Research”, supra note 12. 
46 Ibid.; Keith et al, "Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering”, supra note 34. 
47 Ibid. 
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gaps across multiple scales’ of climate models48 and to characterise the ‘desirable and 
‘non-desirable’ effects of SRM.49   The category of field research is bifurcated: some 
research activities such as technology development have effects that are non-
transboundary;50 other activities such as process studies could pose transboundary 
effects.51  This paper groups all field research together – shaded pale grey – not to be 
unhelpful52 but because the focus of this paper is on degrees of scientific uncertainty 
rather than transboundary harm.  
 
Transboundary effects may or may not be significantly scientifically uncertain.  At the 
start of this section I set out the different levels of certainty for climatic and 
environmental effects of SRM research.  These climatic and environmental effects can 
represent different scales of physical effects of SRM field research.  Clearly climatic 
effects are most likely to be transboundary.  Environmental effects may be transnational 
if they cross borders but they may also be contained within a single legal territory such 
as the UK or the US.  Table 2 gives examples of a range of ‘transboundaryness’ of 
effects of SRM field research.   
 
Not all transboundary effects of SRM field research are necessarily significantly 
scientifically uncertain.  As we saw at the start of this section, scientists are relatively 
certain that global average temperatures will drop following SRM 
deployment/research.   Equally, non-transboundary effects of SRM field research may 
not be significantly scientifically certain.  Scientific uncertainty can be determined 
independently from transboundary effects.   Both scientific uncertainty and 
transboundary effects will shape regulatory frameworks for SRM field research.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 An example might be the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project, 
details found at http://www.spice.ac.uk/ 
51 For example, the proposed SCoPex at Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Reflecting Sunlight to 
Cool Earth, supra note 3, p. 161;  John A Dykema et al. "Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation 
Experiment: a Amall-scale Experiment to Improve Understanding of the Risks of Solar 
Geoengineering." 372.2031 Phil. Trans. R. Soc.  A: (2014): 20140059. 
52 Parker, “Governing Solar Geoengineering Research”, supra note 12. 
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 SRM Field Research 
Scale Non-Transboundary Transboundary 
Type of 
effect 
 Localised Environmental 
Effects 
 
 Climatic Effects 
 Regional or Global 
Environmental Effects 
Example of 
effect 
 Localised loss of 
biodiversity 
 Climatic (reduced global 
temperatures) 
 Climatic (delay in ozone 
recovery) 
 Environmental  
(variations in 
precipitation) 
Table 2 - Transboundary Analysis of SRM Field Research 
Returning to table 1, the lower row bounded in the heavy border sets out three different 
regulatory frameworks for the three categories of SRM research.  The upper row 
differentiates national and international law on the basis of the transboundary effects of 
the research activity: national jurisdictions govern research that has non-transboundary 
effects and international law would govern transboundary effects.  The lowest two rows 
present a more complex view of regulatory frameworks.  I suggest that field research 
may be governed by at least two other regulatory frameworks, which are shaded dark 
grey in the table. TPR enables public interest functions to be exercised by private 
organisations comprising highly technical or scientific expertise in relation to activities, 
such as the development of new technologies53 and environmental regimes54 that 
transcend national boundaries.55  The EU regulatory framework comprises decision-
making structures for proper functioning of the internal market as well as the protection 
of the environment.56  Whilst they are separated in table 1, transnational and EU 
regulation need not be disconnected:  EU institutions have used the rubric of co-
regulation to use fewer resources and regulate more efficiently drawing on private 
capacity associated with transnational regimes.57     
 
                                                 
53 Cafaggi, “New Foundations”, supra note 6. 
54 Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi and Linda Senden, “The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of 
Transnational Private Regulation” 38(1) JLS (2011). 
55 Fabizio Cafaggi, Andrea Renda and Rebecca Schmidt, “Transnational private regulation” in OECD, 
International Regulatory Co-Operation: Case Studies, Vol. 3: Transnational Private Regulation and 
Water Management, (OECD Publishing, 2013). 
56 Asbjorn Aaheim et al, “EuTRACE 2015, supra note 3, pp.90-92. 
57 Scott et al, “The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation”, 
supra note 54, at p.  8 
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There are implications for the regulatory framework of physical effects of SRM field 
research that are significantly scientifically uncertain.   The uncertainty analysis 
presented in table 3 below, which links the two analyses set out in table1 and 2 adds 
to the earlier analysis based on the scale of effects and type of regulatory framework.   
 
 
 Non-Transboundary  Transboundary 
EU  SSU Not SSU SSU Not SSU 
Transnational SSU Not SSU SSU Not SSU 
Table 3- Introducing Significant Scientific Uncertainty (SSU) Analysis: shaded areas indicate activities that 
pose difficulties for regulatory frameworks securing legitimacy. 
 
The two columns relate to transboundary characteristics and the two rows to the 
regulatory frameworks.  For both rows there are transboundary and non-transboundary 
effects which are either significantly scientifically uncertain or not.  The shaded areas 
are characteristics which pose particularly thorny issues for the regulatory frameworks.  
For both transnational and EU regulatory frameworks, SRM field research effects that 
are significantly scientifically uncertain pose difficulties. This is important.  Both EU 
and transnational regulatory frameworks are deficient in addressing the issue of 
legitimacy of SRM field research activities where the effects are significantly 
scientifically uncertain.   The reason for this deficiency stems from the relationship 
between uncertainty and risk.  Whilst uncertainty is a key feature of risk, significant 
scientific uncertainty means that risk assessments are undermined because scientific 
information is not concrete or certain enough to provide a reliable assessment.  The 
inability of science to assess risk has implications for the broader analysis of risk which 
takes into account political and other factors only in the risk management phase.  It is 
for this reason that Majone identifies “arguably the most important question facing 
political leaders, citizens, and experts is how to limit regulatory discretion and enforce 
accountability in policy areas characterised by high uncertainty and cognitive 
complexity and that are also politically very sensitive?”58  I return to this point in part 
III.   
 
                                                 
58 Majone, “Foundations of Risk Regulation”, supra note 37, p. 6 
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The EU is able to rely on orthodox constitutional principles developed in caselaw to 
safeguard legitimacy for regulating activities that are not significantly scientifically 
uncertain.  .  By contrast, the transnational regulatory framework faces challenges to its 
legitimacy across all four types of effects: transboundary and non-transboundary and 
significantly scientifically uncertain or not.  It is to this issue that I now turn.  
 
3. The challenge arising from nascent transnational private regulation of SRM field 
research 
 
Whilst it has been claimed that there is a gap in the regulation of SRM research 
particularly at the international level59 there is evidence of nascent regulation or at least 
movement towards regulation.60  Being nascent means that the institutions and 
procedures governing geoengineering research exist but are difficult to classify.  In this 
section I give an example of how this nascent regulation conceptualised as transnational 
regulation illustrates the challenges to conceptions of legitimacy posed by SRM field 
research.   
 
The argument presented here is done so tentatively: there is relatively little SRM 
research actually taking place,61 and the research that is taking place is doing so in 
myriad departments and institutions.62  In short, SRM and its regulation is at an 
‘upstream’ moment of its emergence.63  The nascent regulation of SRM research can 
be conceptualised as ‘transnational’ thereby illustrating challenges to legitimacy 
understood as the legality of decision-making processes.  I take TPR to comprise three 
elements: regulatory frameworks that “are not constituted through the cooperation of 
                                                 
59 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, The Regulation of 
Geoengineering, Fifth Report of Session 2009-10 (UK Parliament, HC 221), at pp.  20-21, where the 
Committee found there to be a “gap in the regulatory framework”. 
60 Jesse Reynolds, “The Regulation of Climate Engineering” 3(1) Law, Innovation and Technology 
(2011) pp. 113-136, at p. 130; Parker, “Governing Solar Geoengineering Research”, supra note 12. 
61 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, supra note 59, pp. 49-52 
Conclusions and Recommendations, et sqq. Ev27-31 Evidence of Joan Ruddock, Minister for State of 
Department of Energy and Climate Change. 
62Such as law schools, geography departments, earth science schools and meteorological centres 
http://www.iagp.ac.uk/ last accessed on 17th May 2015.  
63 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, supra note 59, at Ev. 31 - 
Evidence of Pidgeon.  
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states as reflected in treaties”;64 comprising non-state actors65 that exercise either 
“autonomous regulatory power or implementing delegated power”;66 and the 
development of “new body of rules, practices and processes…primarily by private 
actors, firms, NGOs, independent experts like technical standard setters and epistemic 
communities”.67   
 
a. Non-state actors 
Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI) is a “cooperative, 
international, NGO-driven initiative, co-convened by the Royal Society, Environmental 
Defence Fund (EDF) and the Academy for the Sciences of the Developing World 
(TWAS)”.68  It was one of the first governance initiatives for SRM69 flowing from the 
Royal Society report of 2009.  It is an interesting example of a non-state actor 
comprising transnational private regulation because of its composition. All three 
convenors are non-state actors in so far as they have no exclusive legal link to the state.  
EDF is a leading not-for-profit organisation in the US “linking science, economics, law 
and innovative private-sector partnerships”;70 the Royal Society is the oldest science 
academy in continuous existence comprising 1400 outstanding Fellows from all areas 
of science; and TWAS is an independent international organisation whose principal aim 
is to “promote scientific capacity and excellence for sustainable development in the 
South”.71  
 
SRM companies have yet to become significant actors although this is may change if 
the commercialisation of research leads to marketable technologies.72 However, 
                                                 
64 Scott et al, “The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation”, 
supra note 54, at p.  3. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Cafaggi, “New Foundations”, supra note 6, at p. 21.  
67 Ibid., at pp. 20-21. 
68 Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI), Solar Radiation Management: The 
Governance of Research, (2012) at p. 12. 
69 Others have been the Oxford Geoengineering Programme and then Geoengineering Governance 
Research.  
70 SRMGI 2012, supra note 68, at p. 4. 
71 Ibid., at p. 4. 
72 On the possibility of accruing carbon credits through SRM see Janine Sargoni and Andrew Lockley, 
"Environment Policy: Solar Radiation Management and the Voluntary Carbon Market." 17(4) 
Environmental Law Review (2015), pp. 266 et sqq.. On commercialisation of geoengineering research 
and vested interests in using geoengineering research, see SRMGI 2012, supra note 68, at p. 17; Steve 
Rayner et al, “The Oxford Principles”, Climate Change (2013), pp. 499 et sqq, at para. 7.2.  For vested 
interests of SRM research see Jane Long and Dane Scott, "Vested Interests and Geoengineering 
Research." 29(3) Issues in Science and Technology  (2013), pp. 45 et sqq.  
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additional financial contributions were made to SRMGI by other non-state actors73 
which aim to tackle climate change through ‘entrepreneurial’ market-based solutions.74   
 
Being a transnational regulatory framework does not preclude the involvement of state 
actors.75  What is important is that it is the nonstate - rather than state – that has become 
the ‘key’ actor, and that the state has, to some extent withdrawn from the process.  In 
his oral evidence to the select committee, Professor Pidgeon, an influential academic 
researcher on the human psychology of risk associated with geoengineering 
recommended that social, political and legal research on governance issues take place 
alongside scientific research on geoengineering.76  It is partly on this basis that the 
Parliamentary committee recommended that the UK government develop a regulatory 
framework, particularly for SRM techniques that fall outside international 
agreements,77 and “carry out research…on the legal, social and ethical implications”78 
of regulation of geoengineering.  Rather than adopting these recommendations directly, 
thereby raising its profile in the area of geoengineering, the government simply deferred 
to the SRM governance initiative demonstrating an unwillingness to ‘commit’.  
Nonstate actors such as SRMGI have stepped into the regulatory vacuum. 
 
b. Crystallising norms and standard-setting 
The development of principles, new bodies of rules or ‘standard-setting’ processes by 
private actors is also an illustration of TPR.   Regulatory principles or standards have 
emerged for governing geoengineering research including the Asilomar Principles,79 
and the Oxford Principles which comprise five ‘high-level’ principles80  each supported 
                                                 
73 Such as the private global non-profit organisations such as the Carbon War Room, 
http://www.carbonwarroom.com/ last accessed on 14 May 2015; and Zennstrom Philanthropies 
http://www.zennstrom.org/ last accessed on 14 May 2015. 
74 Such as the Fund for Innovative Climate and Energy Research (FICER), funded by Bill Gates and 
managed by the University of Calgary. 
75 For a typology of actors see Cafaggi et al, “Transnational Private Regulation: OECD”, supra at note 
55. 
76 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, supra note 59, at Ev. 30; 
http://www.understanding-risk.org/, last accessed on 14 May 2015.  
77 Ibid, p. 25 et sqq., para.  55. 
78 Ibid, p. 33 et sqq., para. 84. 
79 Asilomar Scientific Organizing Committee, "The Asilomar Conference Recommendations on 
Principles for Research into Climate Engineering Techniques." Washington DC, Climate Institute, 
(2010); Margaret Leinen, "The Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention 
Technologies: Background and Overview." Stanf J Law Sci Policy IV (2011), pp. et sqq. 1-5; Schäfer 
and Low, "Asilomar Moments", supra note 21.  
80 Rayner et al, “The Oxford Principles”, supra note 52. 
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with a short explanatory text.81  Every principle carries equal weight:82  principle 1, 
geoengineering to be regulated as a public good; principle 2, public participation in 
geoengineering decision-making; principle 3, disclosure of geoengineering research 
and open publication of results; principle 4, independent assessment of impacts; and 
principle 5, governance before deployment. 
 
These principles are gaining more traction and are prevalent in literature on governance 
of geoengineering in general.  Although it is too soon to tell, they may well crystallise 
in the process of rule-making or standard setting and thereby further characterise 
transnational private regulation.83  As well as being considered by the UK Parliament, 
the Oxford Principles are considered to “provide a sound foundation for the elaboration 
of more concrete governance arrangements for research”84 by the only draft articles to 
date for geoengineering research. 
 
What we see is that these governance principles have been developed by non-state 
scientists.  By the term ‘scientists’ I mean researchers that are experts in scientific fields 
including the natural and social or political scientists.  I use the term scientist in the 
widest sense to differentiate scientific experts from lay persons. For example, the “germ 
of the idea”85 of research guidelines was a conversation between two non natural-
science academics, Steve Rayner and Tim Kruger, who went on to consult with other 
experts from a range of disciplines.  In this way the Oxford Principles were drafted by 
an “ad-hoc”86 group of five academics from British institutions: the Royal Society87 
and the universities of Oxford,88 Cardiff89 and London.90  The academics represent a 
broad, inclusive range of academic interests including science, law, ethics and 
psychology.  The Oxford Principles illustrate the technical – rather than lay – expertise 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. at pp.502-503. 
83 Donal Casey and Colin Scott, “The Crystallisation of Regulatory Norms”, 38(1) JLS (2011), pp. 76. 
et sqq.  
84 Anna-Maria Hubert and David Reichwein, ‘An Exploration of a Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Scientific Research Involving Geoengineering: Introduction, Draft Articles and Commentaries’ 
(Potsdam: IASS Working Paper, 2015), p. 6.  
85 Tim Kruger, “A Commentary on the Oxford Principles: Opinion Article”, Geoengineering Our 
Climate?  Working Paper and Opinion Article Series, 2013.  
86 Rayner et al, “The Oxford Principles”, supra note 52, at p. 500. 
87 Steve Rayner and Catherine Redgwell. 
88 Steve Rayner, Julian Savulescu and Tim Kruger. 
89 Nick Pidgeon. 
90 Catherine Redgwell, University College London, now at All Souls College, University of Oxford.  
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of rule-making within this transnational regulatory framework.  Non-state scientists 
have also endorsed and developed the Oxford Principles by setting standards taking the 
form of  ‘technology-specific research protocols’;91 research guidelines92 and 
thresholds93 and codes of practice.94  The development of governance principles and 
implementing standards by non-state actors is significant because it demonstrates a 
nascent form of autonomous regulatory power which characterises further TPR.     
c. The legitimacy deficit  
Autonomous regulatory power poses problems for legitimacy as conceptualised by 
transnational regulatory theory.      On the whole, and according to general constitutional 
principles, national-centred regulation relies on forms of democratic legitimacy for 
justification.95  However, as regulation is removed from the state, whether that is in 
terms of a movement from national to transnational setting or in terms of a movement 
from public to private actors, the constitutional lines of democratic legitimacy become 
weaker.96  A concept of legitimacy that hinges on the legality of the democratic mandate 
in positive Weberian terms is bound to be reduced in transnational or private regulatory 
regimes; ‘such regimes will necessarily lack legitimacy and any potential for 
legitimacy, in legal terms’.97  For this reason, Majone attributes to the regulatory state98 
the problem of securing and maintaining legitimacy as it transfers regulatory functions 
from state to non-state institutions. This is something to which we return later.   
 
But legitimacy becomes particularly problematic when regulation moves away from 
the state because the orthodox mechanisms of democratic legitimacy are weakened.  
                                                 
91 Rayner et al, “The Oxford Principles”, supra note 52, at p. 509. 
92 Granger Morgan, Robert Nordhaus and Paul Gottlieb, “Needed: Research Guidelines for Solar 
Radiation Management”, Issues in Science and Technology (2013) 37-44. 
93  E. Parson and D. Keith, “End the Deadlock on the Governance of Geoengineering Research” 339 
Policy Forum (2013) 1278-1279, at p. 1278. 
94 Morgan, Nordhaus and Gottlieb 2013, supra note 92, at p. 41; UK House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee 2010, supra note 59, at p. 29. 
95 Keith Syrett, The Foundations of Public Law: Principles and Problems of Power in the British 
Constitution (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2011);  J. Koppell, “Global Governance Organizations: 
Legitimacy and Authority in Conflict” 18 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 2008, 
177-203, at p. 190. 
96 S. Cassese, “Administrative Law Without the State – The Challenge of Global Regulation”, 37 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Policy (2004) 663. 
97 Julia Black, “Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory 
Regimes” 2 Regulation and Governance (2008) 137-164, at, p. 145. 
98 Giandomenico Majone, “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Western Europe” 17 West European 
Politics (1994) 77; Giandomenico Majone, “From Positive toe the Regulatory State: Causes and 
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance”, 17(2) Journal of Public Policy (1997) 139-167 
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Transnational regulation “may end up in a democratic cul-de-sac”.99 Issues of 
legitimacy are particularly salient for transnational private regulation of public 
goods,100 which the Oxford Principles claim SRM research is.  
 
In the preceding section on SRM field research, I suggested that under conditions of 
significant scientific uncertainty tensions are produced between politics and science in 
terms of how to justify who makes decisions about its regulation and how.  The sketch 
of the nascent TPR highlights some of those tensions.  For example, regulatory 
principles are being developed and operationalised101 by predominantly non-state 
actors such as scientists, with minimal involvement from democratic institutions or lay 
persons.  Whilst this could be seen as a form of ‘endogenous’ rule-making identified 
earlier and justified under certain conditions (something to which we return later), 
viewed as TPR it suffers a legitimacy deficit: there is no formal legal authority from 
which those non-state institutions can act.   Clearly the legitimacy deficit might be 
considered less relevant as the regulation is merely ‘nascent’.  But the question of 
legitimacy become more relevant when thinking about how the regulation develops, as 
set out in part I: from nTPR to TPR; to EU or to National or International law.  This 
question of legitimacy will increase in significance as the regulatory framework 
develops.  The deficit as conceptualised in formal legal terms could be minimised if a 
state institution such as the UK Parliament mentioned above, or the EU, were to oversee 
the regulatory framework thereby formalising the transnational arrangements.  It is to 
the EU that we now turn.  
 
III. The EU’s response to the challenge of legitimacy 
 
There are a number of reasons why the EU would regulate SRM field research:  to 
provide a high level of protection of the environment,102 public health103 or to ensure 
the proper functioning of the internal market104  – were one to emerge – through the 
approximation of laws.    In Table 1 above, I set out the broad  position regarding types 
                                                 
99 B. Eberlein and E. Grande, “Beyond Delegation: Transnational Regulatory Regimes and the EU 
Regulatory State”, 12(1) Journal of European Public Policy (2005) 89-112, at p. 106. 
100 Scott et al, “The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation”, 
supra note 54, at p. 6; Cutler, “The Legitimacy of Private Transnational Governance”, supra note 85. 
101 Hubert and Reichwein, “Draft Articles for Code of Conduct”, supra note 84. 
102 Article 191 TFEU. 
103 Article 168 TFEU. 
104 Article 114 TFEU. 
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of regulatory frameworks based on the ‘transboundary’ scale of effects of the regulated 
activity: national regulation for SRM research whose physical effects are contained 
territorially; and international regulation for effects that cross territories.  EU regulation 
was depicted as extending beyond those levels to include regulation of SRM research 
in the laboratory as well as field research comprising transboundary effects.  In practice 
this means that the EU regulatory framework would govern all SRM field research even 
those that do not have transboundary effects.  The regulatory framework would apply 
to specific research proposals as well as the general SRM research endeavour.  By 
comparing briefly with the regulation of genetically modified organisms, or agricultural 
biotechnology, I set out the reasons below.  
 
The EU regulates the process105 of agricultural biotechnology through a matrix of 
secondary legislation.106  The legislation differentiates research that takes place in the 
laboratory, under the Contained Use Directive,107 and experimental releases into the 
environment in the form of crop trials, part B of the Deliberate Release Directive.108   
Non- experimental releases into the environment and the internal market are covered 
under part C of the Deliberate Release Directive.  
 
Both relevant directives – the Deliberate Release Directive and the Contained Use 
Directive – demonstrate some of the complexity associated with implementation.109  
For example, the Contained Use Directive effectively allows member states to 
implement national rules as it chooses whereas part C of the Deliberate Release 
Directive, relating to the marketing of biotech crops, is implemented at the EU level 
with member states given very little discretion as to how to make or apply those rules.  
Part B of the Deliberate Release Directive – regulating experimental releases such as 
crop trials – is somewhere in between; certain elements are left to member states and 
                                                 
105 By contrast, the US regulates biotechnology through the existing regulations for specific products, 
eg biotech crops are regulated under the Plant Protection Act which gives the US department of 
Agriculture and its agency the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services authority to regulate 
biotechnology products of plants and plant pests.   
106 Details of the relevant legislation can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/legislation/index_en.htm.   
107 Directive 2009/41/EC (Recast) [2009] OPJ L125/75 
108 Directive 2001/18/EC 90/220/EEC [2002] OJ L106/1 
109 For an overview of the regulation of GMOs generally see Maria Lee, ‘The EU Regulation of GMOs: 
Law and Decision-Making for a New Technology’ (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 
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others remain with the EU.  The extent to which the principle of subsidiarity110 is 
applied is linked to the functioning of the internal market.111  This internal market 
rationale has been confirmed by policy officers at the Commission; however, in terms 
of deliberate releases of biotech products, a combination of two other rationales is 
evident.  One pertains to the level of ‘containment’112 of the product: contained use 
(such as within a laboratory) is highly contained; crop trials are fairly contained; whilst 
marketing a product for circulation across the EU is uncontained.  The other rationale 
pertains to the territorial ‘scale’113 of potential transboundary harm arising from the 
release of the product: if the harm is contained to a laboratory or a member state, then 
discretion is high; if the threatened transboundary harm is to the wider EU community 
or beyond then discretion in implementation is low.  The European Food Safety 
Authority provides independent scientific advice to the European Commission on 
applications for release into the environment.114   
 
The UK implements part B of the Deliberate Release Directive through the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990 (EPA) and the Deliberate Release Regulations 
2002.115  Consent to release any biotech product is required by section 111 of the 
EPA.116   The specific details of the consent process are set out in the Deliberate Release 
Regulations, including the information required with an application for consent.117   The 
regulations mirror the requirements set out in the Deliberate Release Directive.118  The 
Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the competent 
authority119 and, amongst other things, is required to examine the application for its 
conformity with the rules, evaluate the risks of damage and take into account 
                                                 
110 Article 5 TEU. 
111 Article 114 TFEU on for the approximation of laws in order to establish the proper functioning of 
the internal market, is the legislative base of competence of the EU to pass the Deliberate Release 
Directive, whereas the Contained Use Directive is attributed to article 192 of Title XX on the 
protection of the environment, rather than exclusively on the functioning of the internal market.    
112 Commission Policy Officer Interview. 
113 Commission Policy Officer Interview. 
114 Regulation 178/2002/EC. 
115 The Deliberate Release Regulations were created pursuant to, but also amended, the EPA and 
repealed the previous 1992 deliberate release regulations, see the Explanatory Note on GMO 
(Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002/2443. 
116 Under section 118 EPA, it is a criminal offence to fail to comply with section 111 EPA. 
117 Reg 11 Deliberate Release Regulations. 
118 Schedules in the Regulations link with appendices in the directive, in so far as they require the same 
technical information, although differently numbered. 
119 Section 126 EPA. 
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representations120 prior to its decision to grant consent.121  However, despite the 
national authority having competency to regulate, the criteria for conducting 
environmental risk assessments found in Annex II of the Deliberate Release Directive 
stand as the test by which experimental releases,122 as well as those for wider release 
through marketing,123 are assessed.124   So even where member states have competency 
they must nevertheless comply with standards or processes set at the EU level.  
 
Applying this analysis to the regulation of SRM field research we might expect to see 
the EU develop a regulatory framework for the process of SRM, that is, the general 
scientific endeavour, which is able to assess research projects on a case-by-case basis.   
The regulatory framework could grant regulatory control to member states for 
contained or laboratory research as well as for non-transboundary field research.  
However, the EU is likely to reserve for itself control over transboundary research, 
possibly creating a new European independent scientific advisory committee or by 
using an existing one.  Whilst the impact on the market is not yet significant for SRM, 
that is not to say that it may not exist in the future or that other products become 
significant for the research, such as materials to be used for SRM technology research.  
 
Assuming that the EU regulates SRM research, the issues posed by significant scientific 
uncertainty identified in part II will continue.  In the following section I explain how 
the EU might respond to the legitimacy of decision-making where science is unable to 
adequately assess risk.   
 
1. Attempting to safeguard legitimacy 
 
The EU’s orthodox response to the question of legitimacy lies with the landmark case 
of Meroni.125 The case involved a decision by the European Coal and Steel 
                                                 
120 Deliberate Release Regulation 20. 
121 Deliberate Release Regulation 21. 
122 Part B Deliberative Release Directive. 
123 Part C Deliberate Release Directive.  For marketing biotech products that are not grown in the EU 
but imported see article 5(5) Food and Feed Regulation, 1829/2003/EC. 
124 Some amendments to Annex II have been proposed as General Guidance by EFSA.  A differentiated 
procedure can be used by member state, in which case it will be the ERA confirmed by that member 
state as approved by the Commission.  See Annex A on legal position on ERA in Annex II. 
125 C-9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, Spa v High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community [1957-58] ECR 133. 
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Community’s High Authority to require two agencies, known as the Brussels Agencies, 
to administer a new scrap metal equalisation scheme.  Meroni was a steel company 
subject to the scheme and required to contribute to the fund by the High Authority.  
Meroni successfully sought an annulment of the High Authority’s decision on the basis, 
in part, on the misuse of powers.   The court enunciated four principles regarding 
delegation of powers.  Firstly, the powers delegated must not be more extensive that 
the power of the delegator.  Secondly, a delegation must be express not implied.  
Thirdly, only permissible powers can be delegated:  only those powers that are ‘clearly 
defined executive powers’ rather than discretionary powers can be delegated; the 
consequences of the delegated power must necessarily be the same as the exercise of 
delegating power.  Lastly, the delegation must not disturb the Community’s ‘balance 
of powers’.126  Meroni and subsequent case law has acted as a constitutional limit – the 
Meroni doctrine127 – to the delegation of discretionary powers by Community 
institutions.128   
 
Regulatory agencies, including independent scientific authorities such as the European 
Food Safety Authority, remain purely advisory in the light of the Meroni doctrine and 
are not “fully-fledged” regulatory agencies129 because they lack legislative and 
executive functions.   Technical and scientific assessment of risk undertaken or 
reviewed by them are communicated to political bodies to manage that risk politically, 
so that no discretionary political power is delegated.  In the Pfizer130 case and in the 
context of the precautionary principle, the Court of First Instance reiterated the 
distinction between the scientific risk assessment and political risk management 
functions carried out by expert scientific committees and political community 
institutions respectively.  It found that risk assessment constituted a procedural 
safeguard to the arbitrary exercise of discretion by Community institutions so that “a 
scientific risk assessment carried out as thoroughly as possible on the basis of scientific 
advice founded on the principles of excellence, transparency and independence is an 
                                                 
126 Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome, article 7 EC Treaty, now repealed by article 13 TEU listed 
Community institutions and that they must act ‘within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by 
this Treaty’. 
127 Stefan Griller and Andreas Orator, “Everything Under Control?  The “way forward” for European 
Agencies in the Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine”, 35(1) European Law Review (2010) 3-35. 
128Majone, Foundations of Risk Regulation 2010, supra note 37, at p. 16. 
129 Giandomenico Majone, “The new European Agencies: Regulation by Information”, 4(2) Journal of 
European Public Policy (1997) 262-275, at p. 262. 
130 T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council of the European Union [2002] ECR II-03305 
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important procedural guarantee whose purpose is to ensure the scientific objectivity of 
the measures adopted and preclude any arbitrary measures”.131   
 
This quotation is significant.  It articulates the basis of the conceptual separation of risk 
assessment and risk management set out in the US National Research Council’s Red 
Book132 as being the prevention of biases pandering to public opinion.133  The 
separation of risk assessment and risk management is at the heart of the EU’s approach 
to risk analysis.  But the decision not only articulates this separation but underscores 
the separation by linking it with the separation of science from politics and links that, 
in turn, with the safeguarding of the EU’s balance of powers.  The effect of the court’s 
decision is to confirm that the composition of regulatory institutions is inextricably 
linked to safeguarding the balance of powers through the process of risk analysis.   
 
a. Safeguarding democratic legitimacy 
The Meroni doctrine safeguards democratic legitimacy by institutionally retaining 
political control of decision making for risky activities.  The safeguard is effective and 
appropriate where the scientific uncertainty is not significant, that is, where the science 
is certain enough to form a reliable basis for assessing risk.  In short, science is able to 
do the ‘assessment’ part of the risk analysis, which can then be communicated to the 
political management so that legitimacy is safeguarded.    
 
This analysis of Meroni can be applied to the relationship between EU and transnational 
regulation based on set out in table 3 of part II.  You will recall that the shaded areas 
identified aspects of the regulatory frameworks posed difficulties for legitimacy.  For 
EU regulation of field research having non-significantly scientifically uncertain effects 
– the unshaded areas – legitimacy is not problematic – because Meroni is effective at 
safeguarding democratic legitimacy.  For transnational regulation, legitimacy is 
challenged on two accounts: for the absence of ‘input’ legitimacy – common for all 
transnational regulation – and for the challenge posed in the event of significant 
                                                 
131 Ibid. at para. 7.  
132 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, 
(Washington DC:  National Academic 1983), available on the internet at 
http://www.epa.gov/region9/science/seminars/2012/red-book.pdf (last accessed 14 May 2015). 
133 S. Gabbi, “The Interaction between Risk Assessors and Risk Managers: The Case of the European 
Commission and of the European Food Safety Authority”, 3 European Food and Feed Law Review 
(2007) 126-135. 
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scientific uncertainty.   Drawing on the concept of legitimacy set out in Meroni would 
serve to address the legitimacy deficit for nTPR in some respects but not others; that is, 
for transboundary effects but not under conditions of significant scientific uncertainty.  
The outer shaded areas identifying the legitimacy deficit for non-significant scientific 
uncertainty would be ameliorated.  However, for SRM field research that is 
significantly scientific uncertain, legitimacy conceptualised as ‘legality’, would 
continue.  What connects nTPR and EU regulation is that these difficulties remain also 
for SRM field research regulated by the EU.   
 
b. Remaining difficulties for legitimacy 
Whilst the EU’s response addresses some of the challenges to legitimacy raised by the 
conceptualisations of nascent regulation, some significant difficulties remain.  Firstly, 
institutional arrangements force science and politics to take place as mutually exclusive 
activities when risk is analysed.  The Meroni doctrine ensures that legitimacy is retained 
only by the political – risk management – institutions which are thereby able to 
differentiate and distance themselves from ‘independent’ scientific – risk assessment – 
institutions.  Following this doctrine, the institutions for the analysis of risk of SRM 
research are likely to be bifurcated into the political and scientific; each addressing, in 
turn, separate parts of the process of risk analysis.  In so doing the EU is situated 
squarely in Fisher’s rational-instrumental paradigm of risk regulation:  the 
administration of risk “is understood…to identify and assess a specific risk as well as 
assess the possible consequences of possibly regulatory actions to manage that risk.  
This should involve a collection of all the information available and an assessment of 
that information by experts”.134  
 
Secondly, the institutional separation of science from politics necessarily leads to a 
regulatory principle underpinning risk analysis which I call ‘isolated’ risk assessments.  
The role of science in assessments of risk is isolated so that risk is to be ascertained by 
scientific expertise alone.   The institutional arrangements – the ‘administrative 
constitution’ - do not allow there to be any other information upon which risk is 
assessed (only ‘managed’).   Figure 1 below depicts the relationship between the 
Meroni doctrine, the institutional separation and the lock into isolated risk assessments. 
                                                 
134 Fisher, Risk Regulation, supra note 10, at p. 28. 
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Figure 1 - Institutional Separation of Science from Politics and the Regulatory 'Lock' into Isolated Risk 
Assessments. 
The regulatory lock applies to risk assessments only.  I am not suggesting that risk 
analysis, which includes the political management, communication and scientific 
assessment elements, is bereft of any political or value-laden consideration.  Clearly 
values are included in analyses of risk at the management stage.  The lock applies to 
assessments of risk that can take place solely by scientific institutions and can only ever 
be based on scientific information alone.  Majone claims that the institutional separation 
of risk assessment from risk management is counterproductive because “while the two 
functions are conceptually distinct, in practice they are closely intertwined”.135  Whilst 
this lock may be appropriate where science is certain enough to formulate meaningful 
risk assessments, I suggest that the lock is inappropriate where there is significant 
scientific uncertainty because assessments on scientific information alone are likely to 
be meaningless.  
 
The regulatory ‘lock’ into isolated assessments marks a return to a point foreshadowed 
in the introduction, namely that the EU’s regulatory structure for risky activities tends 
to be rigid and technocratic. The principle of isolated risk assessments is rigid because 
it is unable to apply different types of risk assessment such as the incorporated risk 
assessment.  It prevents the regulatory framework from responding appropriately to 
differing levels of scientific uncertainty posed by different activities.  It is unable to 
respond to the high level of scientific uncertainty characterising trans-scientific 
issues136 such as significant scientific uncertain SRM field research.   In short the EU’s 
response as articulated in the Meroni doctrine is counterproductive in maximising 
legitimacy because of the assumption it makes about the ability of science to assess the 
risk of SRM and its research.  So the legitimacy deficit of nTPR might be ameliorated 
through the EU’s formalisation and commitment to Meroni’s principle of non-
                                                 
135 Majone, “Foundations of Risk Regulation”, supra note 37, at p. 18. 
136 Ibid. 
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delegation but the resulting framework might also be unresponsive, inflexible, 
exclusive and technocratic.  
 
IV. An alternative approach 
This is the story so far:  SRM field research is a trans-scientific issue when its effects 
are significantly scientifically uncertain thereby raising challenges about legitimate 
decision-making.  Conceptualising the nascent regulation of SRM research as nTPR 
allows us to view those legitimacy challenges in terms of the legality of decision-
making institutions and processes.  The EU’s response to the challenge of legitimacy is 
focused on the legal constitutional principle of non-delegation, thereby safeguarding 
the EU’s institutional balance of powers.  In so doing the EU safeguards legitimacy as 
conceptualised by the transnational approach but results in inflexible, unresponsive, 
exclusive and technocratic frameworks.  To ameliorate these problems, also associated 
with legitimacy, we can turn to an alternative conceptualisation of regulation and 
concomitant views of legitimacy.   
 
There are three parts to this final section in which I set out an alternative response to 
regulating SRM research that is better able to maximise the possibility of securing 
legitimacy.  Firstly, I illustrate the conceptualisation of regulation as ‘directly 
deliberative polyarchy’ through the example of responsible research and innovation.  I 
use this functional approach to identify other significant aspects of legitimacy – 
responsiveness, flexibility, deliberation and inclusion.  Secondly, I suggest that an 
incorporated approach to risk assessment can safeguard elements of deliberation and 
inclusion within the existing EU regulatory approach.  Finally, in looking at the 
implications of adopting the incorporated risk assessments, I suggest that the EU will 
be required to take the counter-intuitive response to safeguarding legitimacy by 
departing on occasion from its strict non-delegation position, but in so doing a more 
flexible, responsive framework can emerge that is better able to maximise the 
possibility of securing legitimacy.   
 
1. Illustrating an alternative conceptualisation of regulation and legitimacy 
 
What follows is an illustration of how the regulation of one type of SRM field 
experiment helps us think about alternative conceptualisations of legitimacy and the 
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degree to which they are able to address the deficiencies presented by legitimacy as 
‘legality’ under the conditions of significant scientific uncertainty.  
 
a. SPICE - An example of ‘responsible research and innovation’ 
The Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project137 
investigated the effectiveness of SRM by exploring how the mimicking of natural 
processes of volcanic eruptions by injecting sulphate particles into the stratosphere 
might lower average global temperatures.  There were three working packages which 
aimed to evaluate candidate particles, test delivery systems and model climate impacts.   
 
SPICE is an example of SRM field research because the second of its working packages 
aimed to investigate “the feasibility of putting particles into the stratosphere in order to 
affect global temperatures”.138  This part of the project was to take place outdoors in 
order to explore potential delivery systems of the particles into the stratosphere139 by 
studying a large balloon tethered by a 25km length of pipe to a pump on the ground.   
Unlike other proposed testswhose effects could be transboundary140  it was unlikely that 
this technology development test141 would generate transboundary effects.  It falls 
under non-transboundary SRM field research of table 1.  SPICE is an appropriate 
example because it was more than only a proposed test; it commenced and was subject 
to regulation.  It provides a site in which to consider different conceptualisations of 
regulation and legitimacy.  
 
The progress of SPICE’s second working package is an example of the governance 
framework called ‘responsible innovation’, which I suggest can be classified as a type 
of reflexive governance.  One of SPICE’s funders142 was the Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) which is committed to responsible innovation.  
Working Package 2 of SPICE was required to pass through a ‘stage-gate’: “a decision 
point where [the EPSRC] considers whether to continue an activity, add additional 
                                                 
137 http://www.spice.ac.uk/ (last accessed 12th May 2015) 
138 http://www.spice.ac.uk/project/about-the-project/ (last accessed 12th May 2015) 
139 Working Packages 1 and 3 are laboratory based, but Working Package 2 takes place outdoors.   
140 Supra note 55.  
141 For example, process studies, scaling tests and climate response tests in Keith et al, "Field 
Experiments on Solar Geoengineering”, supra note 34. 
142 Two other funders are Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and the Science and 
Technology Facilities Council (STFC) which all comprise part of group of Research Councils in the 
UK (RCUK).   
30 
 
resource based on progress achieved, or reduce or stop funding. Stage-gating also 
allows major changes in direction to be agreed, guided by the results obtained to 
date”.143  In October 2011, EPSRC’s Societal Issues Panel postponed the field trial for 
six months and in May 2012 cancelled it altogether144  for reasons relating to its 
governance, intellectual property and insufficient deliberation and stakeholder 
participation.145   The stage-gate provides an opportunity to evaluate the extent and 
nature of stakeholder deliberation and direction of the research prior to allocation of 
subsequent tranches of research funding.   
 
Since that time the principles of responsible innovation have become more common-
place.146   The European Commission has identified similar initiatives in other 
member states which it calls ‘Responsible Research and Innovation’, 
recommending a ‘comprehensive approach to achieve…improved alignment’.147   It 
might now be argued that it has developed into a framework148 - although not formally 
part of EU policy - exhibiting four dimensions: anticipation; reflexivity; inclusion; and 
responsiveness.149   
 
b. An illustration of ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’  
Despite lacking conceptual weight,150 responsible research and innovation can be 
viewed as a new governance of science151 that is redolent in a number of ways of a 
broader regulatory theory such as Sabel and Zeitlin’s democratic 
                                                 
143 
http://www.epsrc.ac.uk/about/plans/implementingdeliveryplan/transchange/research/stagegating/Pages/
stagegating.aspx last accessed on 17th April 2014. 
144 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/may/16/geoengineering-experiment-cancelled; and 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21840-controversial-geoengineering-field-test-cancelled.html 
145 http://thereluctantgeoengineer.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/testbed-news.html 
146 IAPG, “The Public and Other Stakeholder Perception of Geoengineering: Facilitating Responsible 
Innovation” Briefing Note 2, available on the internet at: 
http://iagp.ac.uk/sites/default/files/IAGP_Briefing_Note_2.pdf (last accessed on 14 May 2015).  
147 European Commission DG for Research and Innovation Science in Society “Options for 
Strengthening Responsible Research and Innovation” EUR25766 (2013), at p. 3.  
148 Jack Stilgoe, Richard Owen and Phil Macnaghten, “Developing a Framework for Responsible 
Innovation”, 42 Research Policy (2013) 1568-1580; Rene Von Shomberg “Prospects for Technology 
Assessment in a Framework of Responsible Research and Innovation”, in M. Dusseldorp and R. 
Beecroft (eds),  Technikfolgen Abschätzen Lehren (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2012) 
149 Ibid.   
150 Ibid p. 1570. 
151 Ibid p. 1577. 
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experimentalism.152  Democratic experimentalism is an approach to regulating 
“intractable problems that cannot be resolved by a simple appeal to ‘the facts’”153 
characterised by processes of co-design, benchmarking and monitoring.154  Drawing on 
regulation as democratic experimentalism to think about legitimacy for regulating SRM 
field research is appropriate for numerous reasons.  Firstly, it is appropriate for the 
regulation of highly complex problems and solutions155 under conditions of strategic 
uncertainty.156  For the purposes of this paper, in situations where the physical effects 
of SRM field research are significant, scientific uncertainty is indicative of an 
intractable scientific problem that cannot be resolved by science alone.  And whilst 
Sabel and Zeitlin refer to strategic uncertainty as “meaning that policy makers recognise 
that they cannot rely on their strategic dispositions…to guide action in a particular 
domain”157 there is clearly the possibility that a parallel could be drawn with scientific 
uncertainty. 
  
Sabel and Zeitlin call this new form of governance ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’: “It 
is deliberative because it uses argument to dis-entrench settled practices and open for 
reconsideration the definitions of group, institutional, and even national interest 
associated with them.  It is directly deliberative because it uses the concrete experience 
of actors’ differing reactions to current problems to generate novel possibilities for 
consideration…It is polyarchic because it is a system in which the local units learn 
from, discipline and set goals for each other”.158 
 
Responsible research and innovation views itself as experimentalist to the degree 
that it promotes social learning and democratisation159 in much the same way as 
Sabel and Zeitlin’s directly deliberative polyarchy.  Both are procedural.  Directly 
                                                 
152 Charles, F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU” 14(3) European Law Journal (2008) 271-327 
153 Olivier De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble (eds), Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public 
Interest in a Pluralistic World, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. xix.   
154 Charles F Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Experimentalist Governance", in David Levi-Faur (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance, ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 169 et sqq.  
155 Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, "Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy" 3(4) European Law Journal 
(1997), pp. 313 et sqq.  
156 Sabel and Zeitlin, “Learning from Difference”, supra note 152 
157 Ibid., p. 280. 
158 Ibid., p.. 276. 
159 Stilgoe, Owen, Macnaghten, Developing a Framework 2013, supra note 148, at p. 1577. 
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deliberative polyarchy, characterised as a form of reflexive governance160 is a 
dynamic, functional regulatory process that aims to maximise its members’ 
normative expectations through conditions of collective action161 in the same way that 
responsible innovation is “a transparent, interactive process by which societal 
actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other”.162   
 
Legitimacy as conceptualised in directly deliberative polyarchy can be 
characterised as inclusive and deliberative.  It is the normative expectation of 
members that are met, not solely groups of scientific experts or politicians.   
Technocratic forms of authority are dis-entrenched through the democratising 
destabilisation163 of directly deliberate polyarchy.  And it is the concrete experience 
of actors’ differing reactions to current problems which generates new innovated 
solutions.  SRM research community members, university ethics committees, research 
councils etc. are able to participate in transformative politico-scientific decision-
making processes through stage-gate processes, inclusively composed committees, and 
other procedures. 
 
Legitimacy as conceptualised as directly deliberative polyarchy can also be 
characterised as responsive and flexible.   It is the responsiveness and flexibility of the 
regulatory framework which is significant here.  So the framework that comprises 
institutions and procedures that enable members to interact, learn from and mutually 
respond to one other will be more legitimate than a framework that does not.  Being 
flexible marks a regulatory framework as capable of change; of disturbing settled 
practices; of facilitating change through learning.  
 
2. Incorporated risk assessments  
 
                                                 
160 Jacques Lenoble and Marc Maesschalck, “Renewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a 
Reflexive and Learning-based Approach to Governance” in Olivier De Schutter and Jacques Lenoble 
(eds), Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), pp. 3-21. 
161 Ibid; De Schutter and Lenoble, Reflexive Governance, supra note 153; Part of the Sixth European 
Framework Programme for Research and Development REFGOV papers found on the interest at: 
http://sites.uclouvain.be/cpdr-refgov/ (last accessed 14 May 2015) 
162 Von Shomberg, Prospects for Technology Assessment, supra note 148. 
163 Sabel and Zeitlin, Learning from Difference 2008, supra note 152, at p. 277. 
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Thus far the focus of SRM field research has been on its physical effects and the 
problem for legitimacy raised under the conditions of significant scientific uncertainty.  
SRM field research is, as Majone calls it, a ‘trans-scientific’ issue when its effects are 
significantly scientifically uncertain, for which science alone is unable to assess risk 
owing to the ‘inherently unpredictable’164 outcome of action.  This section marks a 
return to an issue touched upon earlier, namely the non-physical impacts of SRM 
research; the different types of sensitivities aroused by SRM research which relate to 
political, moral, ethical, as well as scientific issues.   I suggest an alternative approach 
to regulating risk which accounts for non-physical effects of SRM field research in 
assessments of risk where there is significant scientific uncertainty.  
 
This alternative approach is one based on what I call an ‘incorporated’ approach to risk 
assessment.  An incorporated approach is more inclusive and deliberative and better 
able to meet members’ normative expectations.  There are two elements to incorporated 
risk assessments which link to inclusive and deliberative regulatory mechanisms.  
Firstly, they allow for science and politics to be considered simultaneously during the 
risk assessment phase.  To this extent, risk can be ‘co-assessed’ just as it is ‘co-
produced’.165  Thus, rather than politics being consigned to representative interests in 
democratic institutions such as in the legislature through formal processes such as law-
making, political involvement is able to take place in the administration of regulation 
at the point of assessment of risk.  It is incoherent to use science as the basis for 
assessing risk where scientific uncertainty is high, and as a result something more is 
needed.  By incorporating other bases for its assessment risk can be constructed in ways 
that reflect members’ values rather than on incomplete scientific data.   
 
Secondly, incorporated risk assessments are spaces in which individuals can participate 
directly should they choose.  There are formal opportunities for individuals to 
participate in decision-making processes such as in the form of written comments on 
proposals as well as in attending meetings.  Direct individual participation means that 
it may be possible for lay knowledge to be included in decision-making processes on 
the basis that the participation is deliberative.  Participation does not dispense with 
                                                 
164 Fisher, Risk Regulation, supra note 10, at p. 7. 
165 Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
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expertise but includes all “generally reliable knowledge, subject to methodological and 
epistemological limits”.166  Risk is assessed through a process of deliberation with 
participation by lay persons and through interest group representatives.   
 
It is arguable that deliberation and inclusion by different interest group representatives 
should take place in all risk assessments based on the politically contingent nature of 
science itself.  This is accepted.  But as I set out in the introduction, the intention of this 
paper is not to critique the orthodox epistemology of science nor to call for a wholesale 
shift from the technocratic to the deliberative paradigm.   My approach is pragmatic 
instead: only where there is a significant degree of scientific uncertainty should 
incorporated approach to risk be facilitated.  In so doing my aim is to minimise the 
disruption to the ‘constitutional administration’ of the regulation of SRM research.  
 
I am not alone in advancing a risk-incorporated approach.  Pidgeon167 from the Tyndall 
Centre for Climate Change Research, report the results of one of the first public 
engagement studies into acceptability and ethics of the feasibility test in SPICE; the test 
bed for the pumping of water into the sky using a one-kilometre pipe.  The findings 
from the public engagement research are very interesting.  They include the imperative 
for international governance based on consensus; concerns over the unintended 
consequences of science; knowledge limitation and the links between ‘subscale and 
transboundary effects’, and communication between politicians and researchers.  The 
most significant finding is developed into the discussion of the paper where Pidgeon 
and Parkhill et al refer to the ‘intertwining’ of epistemological, societal and institutional 
ambivalences with the strictly technical and scientific question which, they claim, “will 
pose the greatest challenge”168 for future governance research.   
 
My suggestion is that where scientific uncertainty is significant there is an intertwining 
of the scientific, the social and the political, which evidences the need for a risk-
incorporated approach to risk assessment.  It is the significance of scientific uncertainty 
                                                 
166 Fisher, Risk Regulation, supra note 10, at p. 33. 
167 Nick Pidgeon, Karen Parkhill, Adam Corner and Naomi Vaughan, “Deliberating Stratospheric 
Aerosols for Climate Geoengineering and the SPICE Project”, 3 Nature Climate Change (2013), pp. 
451-457.  
168 Ibid, at p. 454. 
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that triggers the need for a risk-incorporated approach so that the scientific, the social 
and the political can intertwine.    
 
As I suggested above, taking an incorporated approach to risk assessment makes it more 
inclusive and deliberative by providing opportunities for lay persons to be directly 
involved in assessments of significantly scientifically uncertain SRM field research. 
There are other notable advantages for the EU: employing an incorporated approach to 
risk assessment will be to develop a regulatory framework in the EU that is more 
flexible and responsive, and therefore better able to maximise legitimacy.  It is to these 
last characteristics that the paper now turns.  
 
3. Implications for the EU 
 
In section III this paper suggested that the EU’s response to safeguarding legitimacy 
was based on the principle of non-delegation.  The case of Meroni illustrated the EU’s 
preservation of the institutional balance of powers, which in turn preserves the 
institutional separation of science and politics in the assessment and management of 
risk respectively.  I suggested that the Meroni doctrine – this regulatory procedure – 
‘locks’ the EU’s regulatory framework into one specific type of risk analysis.  It is less 
able to respond to different types of activities because change can only take place 
pursuant to treaty revisions.  In short the framework is rigid, not flexible and responsive.  
As a result it is less able to maximise legitimacy as conceptualised by directly 
deliberative polyarchy because it cannot respond to members’ normative expectations.   
 
My suggestion is that a risk-incorporated approach is better able to maximise the 
possibility of securing legitimacy for a regulatory framework in the context of highly 
scientifically uncertain SRM field research by being more flexible, preventing 
regulatory lock-ins and facilitating participation in decision-making processes.   By 
adopting a pragmatic stance, elements of directly deliberative polyarchy can be 
incorporated into the administrative constitutionalism of the EU.     
 
However, as the EU stands, there is little possibility of creating the space for an 
incorporated approach to assessing risk because the principle of non-delegation set out 
in Meroni precludes the delegation of political powers to scientific institutions. The 
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implications for the EU of developing a regulatory framework that maximises the 
possibility of securing legitimacy by being flexible is that it will be required to take the 
counter-intuitive step to delegate decision-making authority in certain circumstances to 
politically and scientifically composed regulatory bodies.   Changing the approach set 
out in Meroni will prevent the lock-in of institutionally separating risk from politics and 
can allow institutions to evaluate risk by incorporating, rather than separating, politics 
and science.   
 
The step is counter-intuitive precisely because that delegation will be seen to disturb 
the constitutional balance of powers that has ties to democratic legitimacy as its core.  
Moreover, in the context of decision-making around scientifically uncertain activities, 
the Meroni doctrine safeguards against the lawful making of decisions by scientists on 
the grounds of efficiency.   
 
It is arguable that these disturbances would reduce formal legal legitimacy.  But the 
disturbance can be minimised in three ways.  Firstly, the delegation can be controlled; 
it can be subject to procedural safeguards such as those set out in the Administrative 
Procedure Act169 in the US.  Safeguards include participatory procedures for decision-
making, such as the Notice and Comment170 and requirements for transparency and 
accountability of committee reporting under the Government in the Sunshine Act.171   
Secondly, the composition of committees would have to be inclusive so that delegated 
decisions would not be made by scientists solely.  The institutions co-assessing risk 
would necessarily be required to be both political and scientific and the composition 
would reflect that.  So, for example, committees would be inclusive and comprise lay 
members as required by the Federal Advisory Committee Act.172   Lastly, strict 
conditions will be imposed on when the delegation can take place.  In the context of 
SRM field research this will be when a threshold of scientific uncertainty is significant. 
.   
 
                                                 
169 5 U.S.C. § 551. 
170 5 U.S.C. § 533. 
171 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(3). 
172 5 U.S.C.  
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The threshold for significant scientific uncertainty is noteworthy because it is the point 
at which a move from the isolated to incorporate risk assessment is triggered.  Who 
decides this threshold? I suggest that it be agreed by political institutions on advice 
from scientists as a ‘framework threshold’ in much the same way as ‘framework goals’ 
such as ‘good water status’ comprise part of the EU’s experimentalist architecture 
identified by Sable and Zeitlin.  By contrast, the decision as to whether SRM field 
research actually falls within the threshold and therefore classifiable as significantly 
scientifically uncertain rests with scientists themselves.  Again, this poses difficulties.  
There may be problems such as whether scientists are likely to be biased and want to 
preserve for themselves their own autonomous space.  There is also the charge that the 
decision to use the risk incorporated mechanism thereby triggering a delegation of 
decision-making power has simply replaced the scientific assessment of risk:the 
decision about risk has been shifted further up the line to question of whether the 
technology is scientifically uncertain or not.   
 
These problems are valid but not insurmountable.  The pragmatic stance accepts that 
decisions about scientific uncertainty need to be taken somewhere and by someone.  
Climate scientists are able to quantify uncertainty; such quantifications from the basis 
of IPCC AR reports.  In the past significant scientific uncertainty has led to scientists 
calling for governance arrangements.  The Berg letter of 1974 announced the limits of 
scientific understanding associated with the development of biotechnology.  The Royal 
Society’s own 2009 report is an example of the scientific community announcing the 
discipline’s concerns of levels of certainty.  Moreover, the US National Academy of 
Science Committee on Geoengineering the Climate recommended a ‘serious 
deliberative process’ to decide governance issues173 as well as natural scientists and 
engineers suggesting governance thresholds for SRM field experiments.174     It is 
arguable then that scientists are capable and willing to make decisions about uncertainty 
even if that means triggering rules for constraining the scientific enterprise.   
 
                                                 
173 Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth, supra note 3, at p. 190. 
174 Keith et al, "Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering”, supra note 34.  
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The call to ‘mellow’ the Meroni doctrine175 and permit delegation subject to strict 
safeguards is, to some extent, pushing at an open door.  The UK failed recently in its 
attempt to have annulled by the EU Court of Justice based on Meroni’s principle of 
non-delegation a discretionary power conferred to the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) by the Council and European Parliament.176  Article 28 of the ‘short-
selling’ regulation177 gives ESMA the power to adopt intervening measures to ban 
short-selling ‘in exceptional circumstances’ where there is a threat to the proper 
functioning of the financial markets.  The Court rejected the UK’s plea that the power 
entails ‘a very large measure of discretion’178 on the basis that they are amenable to 
judicial review179 and therefore suitably circumscribed.180   
 
The judgment does not undermine the constitutional principle set out in Meroni and the 
necessity of the balance of powers.  The ESMA case is situated in a different context to 
that of scientific uncertainty in this paper and adopts a different basis of legitimacy, 
arguably output legitimacy181 but it does place greater weight on the conditions of 
delegation and the availability of judicial review, which arguably have changed since 
Meroni.  The overall point is that Meroni has not been applied strictly to preclude 
regulatory measures by ESMA and my suggestion that delegation take place subject to 
strict safeguards is not entirely unprecedented.      
 
The pragmatic stance and incorporated risk assessment advanced in this paper balances 
the need of objective certainty from science (as opposed to decision made on politically 
arbitrary public opinion or other criteria) with the understanding that under certain 
conditions alternative constructions of risk should be recognised.  My approach differs 
from Fisher’s deliberative-constitutive paradigm in which a shift from one paradigm to 
another requires a substantial change to the administrative constitution.  The pragmatic 
                                                 
175 Jacques Pelkmans and Marta Simoncini, “Mellowing Meroni: How ESMA can help build the Single 
Market” Centre for European Policy Studies: Commentary 18th February 2014 (2014),  pp. 1-5. 
176 Case C-270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and 
Council of the European Union [2014] 
177 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short-selling and certain aspects 
of credit default swaps, OJ 2012 L 86. 
178 Ibid., at para. 54. 
179 Ibid, at para. 53. 
180 Ibid, at para. 45. 
181 Ibid, at para 35: ESMA’s measures “require a high level of technical and economic expertise and 
information”. 
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stance accepts that whilst there may be desirable elements of the deliberative paradigm, 
there need not take place a wholesale change in the administrative constitution away 
from the technocratic paradigm.   The pragmatic stance minimises the disturbance of 
the EU’s constitutional balance of powers, and as such may be considered an 
improvement on a regulatory framework located in the deliberative paradigm alone.   
 
V Conclusion 
Claims about the legitimate regulation of SRM field research are easy to make but 
difficulty to substantiate.  Firstly, the current absence of a formal regulatory or legal 
framework for SRM field research makes it difficult to suggest improvements that 
strengthen its legitimacy. Secondly, the significant scientific uncertainty of SRM field 
research and its effects link to questions of risk and the relationship between science, 
politics and other value-systems.  Thirdly, there is no certainty about what kind of 
regulatory framework will emerge, leading to similar uncertainty about the conceptions 
of legitimacy that will be relied upon.   In trying to suggest mechanisms to maximise 
the possibility of securing legitimacy, this paper has engaged with many variables:  
what sort of regulatory framework will emerge; how can risk be regulated; and what 
concept of legitimacy will be employed?  It is within the context of these significant 
variables that the paper’s central claim has been made. 
 
The paper suggested how the EU regulation of SRM field research could be designed 
to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy.  Under conditions of significant 
scientific uncertainty, SRM field research poses challenges for its legitimate regulation.  
The EU’s orthodox response to the challenge to legitimacy is to ensure the institutional 
‘balance of powers’.  This response is deficient because it entrenches a risk analysis 
approach that is inappropriate for significantly scientifically uncertain SRM 
technology.  My suggestion is a pragmatic one.  It is to institutionalise an incorporated 
approach to risk which provides space for deliberative and inclusive decision-making 
in the technocratic paradigm as part of a responsive and flexible framework whilst 
retaining the general institutional balance of the EU.  In doing so, the EU develops 
spaces for more directly deliberative polyarchy without jettisoning its orthodox 
constitutional approach.   
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In the introduction I explained why the paper engages with two substantial areas of 
regulatory scholarship: EU regulation of risk and transnational private regulation.  In 
exploring the relationships between conceptualisations of legitimacy and their 
respective regulatory frameworks, this paper is not situated firmly in the literature on 
transnational private regulation or in EU regulatory scholarship.  Instead it spans both.  
The aim has not been to contribute solely to one or other area of scholarship but to 
evaluate how each views legitimacy and then apply it in the context of the regulation 
of SRM field research.  The paper is intended to be of interest to both audiences because 
it provides an opportunity to apply the concept of legitimacy beyond the terms 
ordinarily expected of each respective regulatory theory.  In so doing the paper 
endeavours to provide a theoretical opening in which both audiences are able to think 
about how to govern SRM field research that best maximises the possibility of securing 
legitimacy.   
 
